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Abstract: Any precise version of H-D needs to handle various problems, most notably, 
the problem of selective confirmation:  Precise formulations of H-D should not have the 
consequence that where S confirms T, for any T', S confirms T&T'.  It is the perceived 
failure of H-D to solve such problems that has lead John Earman to recently conclude 
that H-D is "very nearly a dead horse". This suggests the following state of play:  H-D is 
an intuitively plausible idea that breaks down in the attempt to give it a precise 
formulation.  Indeed I think that fairly captures the view among specialists in the field of 
confirmation theory.  Here I argue that the truth about H-D is largely the reverse:  H-D 
can be given a precise formulation that avoids the longstanding technical problems, 
however, it relies on a fundamentally unsound philosophical intuition.  The bulk of this 
paper involves reviewing the problems affecting previous attempts at giving precise 
formulations of H-D and displaying some recent versions that can handle these 
problems.  It  then briefly explains why the basic intuition behind H-D is itself unsound, 
namely, because H-D involves a tacit assumption of inductive scepticism.  Finally, the 
historical relation between H-D and the positivists' quest for a criterion of empirical 
significance will be reconsidered with the surprising result that having glossed H-D as 
fundamentally unsound it is concluded that a sound version of the criterion of empirical 
significance is now available.  The demarcation criterion, the positivists' philosopher's 
stone that serves to separate claims with empirical significance from claims lacking 
empirical significance having finally been found, it is argued that we should regard 
empirical significance as just one among a variety of virtues and not follow the positivists 











1.  Introduction:  The Perceived State of Play 
 Clark Glymour, in summing up various strategies for relating evidence to theory, 
says the following concerning hypothetico-deductivism, hereafter H-D,  
At one time, anyway, the most popular version of the evidential connection took it 
to depend on a deductive connection going in the opposite direction.  Evidence 
confirms a theory if the evidence can be deduced, in an appropriate way, from 
the theory.  It may, far all I know, still be the most popular version. (Glymour 
1980, p.12) 
 
 Any precise version of H-D, besides capturing the general insight of H-D, that 
one confirms a theory by testing its consequences, needs to handle the following 
problems, 
 
(1) The problem of selective confirmation, or, tacking by conjunction:  Precise 
formulations of H-D should not have the consequence that where S confirms T, 
for any T' such that  T&T' is contingent then S  confirms T&T'; 
 
(2) The problem of pseudo confirmations, or, tacking by addition:  Precise 
formulations H-D should not have the consequence that where S confirms T, for 
any S' such that SvS' is contingent, SvS' confirms T; 
and  
(3)  The problem of instance confirmation:  Precise formulations of H-D should 
allow that instances confirm their generalizations. 
 Its is the perceived failure of H-D to solve such problems that has lead John 
Earman to recently conclude that H-D is "very nearly a dead horse" (Earman 1992, 
p.63-64).  Earman cites Glymour (1980) where the emphasis is squarely on H-D's 
perceived inability to handle the problem of selective confirmation.1  It is interesting to 
juxtapose Glymour's observation that H-D may still be the most popular account of 
confirmation with Earman's nearly-a-dead-horse-verdict.  The difference here is not 
merely a reflection of the 12 years that separate Glymour's observation from Earman's 
                                                          
1
  Glymour (1980a) makes further objections to H-D.Gemes (1993) offers replies to these 
objections. 
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verdict.  While Earman is particularly concerned with the technical criticisms that have 
long plagued all attempts to give a precise formulation to H-D, Glymour's observation is, 
I suspect, based more on the fact that generally philosophers, perhaps leaving aside 
specialists in confirmation theory, are still largely sympathetic to H-D's central claim that 
confirmation of a theory comes through testing its consequences.  This suggests the 
following state of play:  H-D is an intuitively plausible idea that breaks down in the 
attempt to give it a precise formulation.  Indeed I think that fairly captures the view 
among specialists in the field of confirmation theory.  Here I will argue that the truth 
about H-D is largely the reverse:  H-D can be given a precise formulation that avoids the 
longstanding technical problems such as (1), (2) and (3), however, it relies on a 
fundamentally unsound philosophical intuition.  The bulk of this paper will be concerned 
with reviewing the problems affecting previous attempts at giving precise formulations of 
H-D and displaying some recent versions that can handle these problems.  I will then try 
to briefly explain why I think the basic intuition behind H-D is itself unsound.  Finally, the 
historical relation between H-D and the positivists' quest for a criterion of empirical 
significance will be reconsidered with the surprising result that having glossed H-D as 
fundamentally unsound it is concluded that a sound version of the criterion of empirical 
significance is now available. 
 
2. Canonical Formulations of H-D and their Problems 
 
 Simple canonical versions of H-D such as 
(H-D1)  S confirms T iff S and T are contingent an T├S, 
fail to address any of problems (1), (2) or (3).  However, Carl Hempel (Hempel 1965, 
p.26-7), a founding father of H-D, and, more recently, Paul Horwich (Horwich 1983, 
p.58), have suggested the following alternative version of H-D,  
(H-D2) S confirms T iff S and T are contingent and for some S' and S'', S┤├S'&S'', 
S'&T├ S'', and  S'├S'' 
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Hempel introduced his version of (H-D2) under the name "the prediction-criterion of 
confirmation".  While (H-D2) fails to address problems (1) or (2) it successfully deals 
with (3), producing the result, for instance, that 'Ra&Ba' confirms '(x)(Rx ⊃  Bx)'.  More 
generally (H-D2) has the consequence that where αc&ßc is an instance of the universal 
generalization (x)(αx ⊃ ßx),   αc&ßc  confirms (x)(αx ⊃ ßx).  However, as noted in 
Gemes (1990), (H-D2) also produces the disastrous result that 'Ra&~Ba' confirms 
'(x)(Rx ⊃  Bx)' since, 
                 Ra&~Ba ┤├ ((x)(R x ⊃ Bx) ⊃  (Ra&~Ba)) & (Ra&~Ba), and      
                ((x)(Rx  ⊃ Bx) ⊃ (Ra&~Ba)) & (x)(Rx  ⊃ Bx)├  Ra&~Ba, and   
((x)(Rx  ⊃ Bx) ⊃  (Ra&~Ba)├/ (Ra&~Ba).      [‘α├/β’ means β is not a  
consequence of α]              
 Nor will it do to merely supplement (H-D2) with the condition that S be consistent with 
T, since this would still leave us with a version of H-D that has the consequence that for 
any contingent S and T such that S is consistent with T, S confirms T, since in this case 
it is still true that S ┤├ (T ⊃ S)&S, T&(T ⊃ S) ├ S, and (T ⊃ S) ├ S.2
 
 More commonly, advocates of H-D troubled by problem (3) have offered 
formulations of H-D which make use of the notion of relative confirmation, such as  
(H-D3) S confirms T relative to background evidence b iff (T&b) is contingent and 
(T&b)├ S and b ├ S. 
While (H-D3) does not have the consequence that, for example, 'Ra&Ba' confirms 
'(x)(Rx ⊃Ba)' it does have the consequence that 'Ba' confirms '(x)(Rx ⊃ Ba)' relative to 
'Ra'.  This has been deemed a close enough surrogate to instance confirmation.  
However (H-D3) does not address problems (1) and (2).  Indeed, until recently, no 
formal version of H-D has come close to successfully addressing these problems.  
2 For a fuller discussion of these issues see Gemes (1990). 
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Gerhard Schurz has lately produced a precise formulation of H-D which successfully 
handles (1) and (2).  Furthermore, with a little modification along lines already 
suggested by Schurz, it can handle problem (3).   
 
 
3.  Schurz's New Formulation 
 Before we give Schurz's formulation of H-D we need to get some preliminary 
definitions on the table.  Basically Schurz's strategy is to determine whether S confirms 
T by first constructing canonical versions of S and T and then making sure that the 
deduction of S from T involves no extraneous elements.  Thus where T├ S, and hence 
T&T' ├ S, this does not make for S confirming T&T' because T' is extraneous to the 
derivation of S.  Thus where T ├ S, and hence T ├ SvS', SvS' does not confirm T 
because SvS' is entailed by T irrespective of the nature of S'.  To capture this formally 
Schurz introduces the notions of conclusion relevant deductions, premise relevant 
deductions and relevant consequence elements as follows: 
Where α├ ß, α├ ß is conclusion relevant deduction iff no predicate in ß is such 
that the replacement of some of its occurrences in ß by any other predicate of the 
same arity results in a ß' such that α ├ ß'. (Cf. Schurz 1991, p. 409-411).3
 
Where  α├ ß, α├ ß is a premise relevant deduction iff (i) there is no single 
occurrence of a predicate in  α such that its replacement in  α by any other 
predicate of the same arity results in an  α' such that  α' ├ ß and (ii) and there are 
no predicate occurrences in  α such that they are replaceable by other predicates 
of the same arity resulting in an  α' such that  α' ´├ α.  (Cf. Schurz 1991, p. 421-
422). 
 
ß is a relevant consequence element of α iff  α ├ ß is a conclusion relevant 
deduction and there exists no finite set S of conclusion relevant consequences of 
                                                          
3  So, for instance, (x)Fx ├ FavGb is not a conclusion relevant deduction since the replacement of 
'G' in 'FavGb' by any other predicate does not lead to the disruption of the deduction. 
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α such that ß is logically equivalent to the conjunction of the members of S and 
for each member φ of S, φ is shorter than ß.  (Cf. Schurz 1994, p. 184)4
 
We are now in a position to give Schurz's new definition of H-D: 
 
(H-D4)  S confirms T iff for some S' and T' which are equivalent to S and T, S' is a 
conjunction of relevant consequence elements of S, T' is a conjunction of 
relevant consequent elements of T, and T' and S' are contingent and T' ├ S' and 
the deduction T' ├ S'is a conclusion and premise relevant deduction.  (Cf. 
Schurz, ibid., and Gemes 1994, p.175). 
 
(H-D4) does not allow that where S confirms T, for any T' if T&T' is contingent then S 
confirms T&T', because  in such cases T&T' ├ S is not a premise relevant deduction.  
(H-D4) does not allow that where S confirms T, for any S' such that SvS' is contingent, 
SvS' confirms T, because, in such cases T ├ SvS' is not a conclusion lrelevant 
deduction.  Thus (H-D4) successfully handles problems (1) and (2).  However, as it 
stands, (H-D4) does not allow for instance induction.  In order to deal with problem (3) 
Schurz suggests (H-D4) be supplemented with the following principle  
 (S.C.)   If S confirms T and S* logically implies S and is consistent with T, then S* 
confirms T   (Schurz 1991, p. 394 and 1994, p. 183-4) 
The idea here is that while (H-D4) does note entail that, for instance, 'Ra&Ba' confirms 
'(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)', it does entail that 'Ra ⊃ Ba' confirms '(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)', and hence by (S.C.), 
since 'Ra&Ba' logically implies 'Ra ⊃ Ba' and is consistent with '(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)', 'Ra&Ba' 
confirms '(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)'.  Now, in fact, strictly speaking, (S.C.) and (H-D4) are 
incompatible.  (H-D4) has as a consequence that 'Ra ⊃ Ba' confirms '(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)' and 
'Ra&Ba' does not confirm '(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)', while (S.C.) has the consequence that if 'Ra ⊃ 
4 Thus 'Fa ⊃ Gb' is not a relevant consequent element of 'Fa&(Fa ⊃ Gb)' since 'Fa&(Fa ⊃ Gb)' is 
equivalent to the conjunction of the members of the set {'Fa', Gb'} and each member of the set is 
shorter than 'Fa ⊃ Gb'.  The recourse to relevant consequence elements is needed otherwise 
Schurz's definition of H-D, (H-D5) below,  would have the consequence that 'Gb' confirms 
'Fa&(Fa ⊃ Gb)' since Fa&(Fa ⊃ Gb) ├ Gb is a premise and conclusion relevant deduction.   For 
more on this see Gemes (1994) and Schurz (1994). 
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Ba' confirms '(x)(Rx  ⊃ Bx)' then so does 'Ra&Ba'.  This follows since (H-D4) gives both 
necessary and sufficient conditions for confirmation.  We could render (H-D4) and (S.C.) 
compatible by construing (H-D4) as giving only sufficient conditions for confirmation, 
replacing 'E confirms H iff' in (H-D4) with 'E confirms H if'.  However I think Schurz is 
best understood as suggesting that (H-D4) incorporate (S.C.) in the following manner 
 
(H-D5) S confirms T iff S is consistent with T and for some S' and T', S' is a 
consequence of S and T is equivalent to T', S' is a conjunction of relevant 
consequent elements of S', T' is a conjunction of relevant consequent elements 
of T, and T' and S' are contingent and T' ├ S' and the deduction T' ├ S' is a 
conclusion and premise relevant deduction. 
 
(H-D5) does handle problems (1), (2) and (3), that is to say, it disallows tacking by 
conjunction and disjunction and allows for instance confirmation.   
 One of the problems with (H-D5) is that it loses some of the deductive flavor of 
more conventional versions of H-D.  Indeed, to some degree, it seems to be more in line 
with an inductivist conception of confirmation.  For instance, it allows that 'Fb' confirms 
'Fa'.  This follows since 'Fb' is consistent with 'Fa', '(∃x)Fx' is a consequence of 'Fb', 'Fa' 
is a one conjunct conjunction of relevant consequence elements of 'Fa', '(∃x)Fx' is a one 
conjunct conjunction of relevant consequence elements of '(∃x)Fx', and Fa ├ (∃x)Fx is a 
conclusion and premise relevant deduction.  On the other hand, (H-D5) goes some way 
beyond induction since it also allows that 'Fb&~Fc&~Fd&~Fe' confirms both 'Fa' and '~Fa' 
since 'Fb&~Fc&~Fd&~Fe' entails both '(∃x)Fx' and '(∃x)~Fx'. 
 (H-D5) also has the very strange result that 'Ra&~Rb&~Bb' confirms both '(x)(Rx 
⊃ Bx)' and '~(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)'.  'Ra&~Rb&~Bb' confirms '(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)' since it is consistent 
with '(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)' and it entails 'Rb ⊃ Bb' and both 'Rb ⊃ Bb' and '(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)' are 
conjunctions of their own relevant consequence elements and the deduction (x)(Rx ⊃ 
Bx) ├ Rb ⊃ Bb is premise and conclusion relevant. 'Ra&~Rb&~Bb' confirms '~(x)(Rx ⊃ 
Bx)' since it is consistent with '~(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)' and it entails '(∃x)Rx&(∃x)~Bx' and both '(∃
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x)Rx&(∃x)~Bx' and '~(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)' are conjunctions of their own relevant consequence 
elements and the deduction ~(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx) ├ (∃x)Rx&(∃x)~Bx is premise and conclusion 
relevant. 
 Generally the consistency principle, 
(C.P.) If E confirms H then it does not confirm ~H,5
is taken as a adequacy condition for any definition of confirmation.  Moreover, H-D, 
which in all its earlier formulations requires H to entail contingent E if E is to confirm H, 
is generally taken to satisfy (C.P.).  This is good reason to conclude that (H-D5) is not 
an adequate representation of H-D.6
 Above we saw that in order to handle problem (3), the problem of instance 
confirmation, Schurz recommends (H-D4) be supplemented with the Principle of 
Strengthening the Confirmans, (S.C.).  But strictly speaking (H-D4) and (S.C.) are 
inconsistent.  To incorporate (S.C.) within a version of something like (H-D4) we 
constructed (H-D5).  However (H-D5) runs foul of the consistency principle (C.P.).  In 
order to handle problem (3) without recourse to a definition embodying principle (S.C.) 
we can construct the following version of (H-D4) which  
like the old (H-D3) makes use of the notion of relative confirmation,  
 
(H-D6)  S confirms T relative to B iff S is consistent with T and B and for some S' and 
(T&B)', S' is equivalent to S , (T&B)' is equivalent to (T&B), S' is a conjunction of 
5  This is not to be confused with the much more contentious principle that if E confirms H and 
H' is inconsistent with H then E does not confirm H'.  It is one thing to say that there are cases 
where evidence confirms both a claim and some rival claim and quite another to say there is 
evidence that confirms a claim and its negation. 
6 Note, (H-D4) when combined with (S.C.) produces these same strange results.  This follows 
even where (H-D4) is construed as given only sufficient rather than necessary and sufficient 
conditions for confirmation. 
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relevant consequence elements of S,  (T&B)' is a conjunction of relevant 
consequent elements of (T&B), and (T&B)' and S' are contingent and (T&B)' ├ S' 
and the deduction (T&B)' ├ S' is a conclusion and premise relevant deduction. 
(H-D6) handles problems (1) and (2), and, while it does not produce (H-D5)'s result that, 
for instance, 'Ra&Ba' confirms '(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)', it produces the surrogate result that 'Ba' 
confirms '(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)' relative to 'Ra'.  (H-D6) does not yield the inductivist result that 
'Fb' confirms 'Fa' nor does it have (H-D5)'s strange consequences that 
'Fb&~Fc&~Fd&~Fe' confirms both 'Fa' and '~Fa' and 'Ra&~Rb&~Bb' confirms both '(x)(Rx 
⊃ Bx)' and '~(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)'.   
 (H-D6) does however have the result that '(∃x)Fx' confirms 'Fa' relative to any 
tautology.   Furthermore, while (H-D6) has the desirable result that evidence 
'Ha&Rb&Wc&Dd' confirms '(x)(Hx ⊃ Rx)&(x)(Wx ⊃ Dx)' relative to the background claim 
'Ra&Hb&Dc&Wd', it also produces the strange result that the same evidence relative to 
the same background claim confirms '(x)(Hx ⊃ Rx)&(x)(Wx ⊃ Dx)&(x)(Hx ⊃ Wx)&(x)(Rx 
⊃ Dx)'.  The later result follows since '(x)(Hx ⊃ Rx)&(x)(Wx ⊃ Dx)&(x)(Hx ⊃ Wx)&(x)(Rx 
⊃ Dx)&(Ra&Hb&Dc&Wd)' is equivalent to '(x)(Hx ⊃ Wx)&(x)(Rx  ⊃ Dx)&(x)(Wx ⊃ 
Rx)&Ra&Hb&Dc&Wd' which is a conjunction of its own relevant consequence elements 
and the deduction (x)(Hx ⊃Wx)&(x)(Rx ⊃ Dx)&(x)(Wx ⊃ Rx)&Ra&Hb&Dc&Wd ├ 
Ha&Rb&Wc&Dd is a conclusion and premise relevant deduction.  So, for instance, 
finding that a is a human and b is rational and c is water and d is H2O confirms the 
claim that being human and being rational are (materially) equivalent and being water 
and being H2O are (materially) equivalent and being human and being water are 
(materially) equivalent and being rational and being H2O are (materially) equivalent 
relevant to the background claim a is rational and b is human and c is H2O and d is 
water. 
 Concerning these cases there are two natural responses.  The first response is 
to say that the intuitive notion of hypothetico-deductive confirmation is committed to the 
claim that these are actual cases of confirmation.  Having made this response one may 
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then go on defend H-D by arguing that they do in fact constitute genuine cases of 
confirmation, or, alternatively one might argue that they show that H-D itself is 
fundamentally flawed.  The second response is to say that H-D is not committed to 
these being genuine cases of confirmation and hence that (H-D6) is not a fully adequate 
representation of H-D.   
 (H-D6) has the result, that 'Ba' does not confirm 'Ra ⊃ Ba' relative to 'Ra'.  The 
problem here is that the relevant consequent elements of 'Ra&(Ra ⊃ Ba)' are 'Ra' and 
'Ba' and the deduction Ra&Ba ├ Ba is not premise relevant.   Yet, according to (H-D6), 
while 'Ba' does not confirm 'Ra ⊃ Ba' relative to 'Ra', 'Ra&Ba' does confirms 'Ra ⊃ Ba' 
relative to 'Ra'.  Finally, (H-D6) has the result where there is no logical equivalent (T&B)' 
of (T&B) such that the deduction (T'&B') ├ S is premise relevant S cannot confirm T 
relative to B.  Thus, for instance, 'Fa' does not confirm '(x)(Fx)' relative to 'Fb'.  
Generally, this suggests that (H-D6) does not make for a very useful definition of 
relative confirmation since we often want to consider cases where the background 
evidence B contains surplus information which renders the derivation of the alleged 
confirming evidence E from the conjunction of  T and B is a non-premise relevant 
deduction. 
 Here one might best respond by simply claiming that it is better for a definition of 
confirmation to be a too exclusive than too inclusive.   
 
4.  Gemes' New Formulation 
 Despite the above mentioned problems I think Schurz's general strategy for 
expressing H-D is on the right track.  That is to say, I endorse his approach of looking 
for relevance considerations in the deduction of S from T to determine if S H-D confirms 
T.  In particular, to find whether an axiom A of a theory T is confirmed by S we need to 
find a canonical version T' of T and then see if A is a content part of those axioms of T' 
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necessary for the derivation of S from T'.  To do this we need first to get an account of 
what the content of a theory is and what counts as a natural axiomatization.  Elsewhere 
I have suggested the following account of content and natural axiomatization, 
 
 α is part of the content of ß iff  and ß are contingent, ß ├ α, and every α-relevant 
model of  α has an extension which is a ß-relevant model of ß, (Gemes 1997, but 
see also Gemes 1994b).7  
 
 T' is a natural axiomatization of T iff (i) T' is a finite set of wffs such that T' is 
logically equivalent to T, (ii) every member of T' is a content part of T' and (iii) no 
content part of any member of T' is entailed by the set of the remaining members 
of T'. (Gemes 1993, p.483) 
 
Theses definitions pave the way for the following definition of H-D, 
7  To define the notion of a relevant model we first need to define the notion of a relevant atomic 
wff.  An atomic wff ø is relevant to wff α iff for some partial substitutional interpretation P, 
every full substitutional interpretation P' that is an extension of P is a model of α and each such 
extension of P assigns the same value to ø, and there is no proper substitutional sub-
interpretation P'' of P, such that for every full substitutional interpretation of P''' that is an 
extension of P'', P''' is a model of α  For any wff α, a α-relevant model M of α is a distribution of 
truth values to all those atomic wffs relevant to α (and to no other atomic wffs), such that α is 
true on M given a substitutional reading of α.  Thus the only 'Fa'- relevant model of 'Fa' is that 
partial interpretation which assigns T to the atomic wff 'Fa' and makes not other assignments to 
atomic wffs.  The only '(x)Fx'-relevant model of '(x)Fx' is that partial interpretation which 
assigns T to every atomic wff of the form 'Fc' where c is any individual constant of the language 
in question, and makes no other assignment to atomic wffs.  So the only 'Fa'-relevant model of 
'Fa' can clearly be extended to a '(x)Fx'-relevant model of '(x)Fx', so 'Fa' is a content part of 
'(x)Fx'.  'FavGb', on the other hand, is not a content part of '(x)Fx' since that 'FavGb'-relevant 
model of 'FavGb' which assigns T to 'Gb' and makes no other assignment to atomics wffs can not 
be extended to a '(x)Fx'-relevant model of '(x)Fx' since no such model makes any assignment to 
'Gb'.  For more on this see Gemes (1997). 
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(H-D7)  S hypothetico-deductively confirms axiom A of theory T  relative to background   
 evidence b iff S and b are content parts of (T&b), and there is no natural   
 axiomatization, n(T), of T such that for some subset s of the axioms of n(T), S is 
a content part of (s&b) and A is not a content part of (s&b).  (Gemes (1993), 
p.486) 
(H-D7) yields the equivalent of a non-relative version of H-D by simply letting b be any 
tautology.  (H-D7) solves the problem of tacking by conjunction since where the content 
of axiom A is necessary for the derivation of S from background evidence b, it does not 
follow that the content of the conjunction of A and arbitrary A' will also be necessary for 
the derivation of S from background b.   That is to say, in the specific terms of (H-D7), 
where A needs to be part of the content of s&b if S is to be part of the content of s&b it 
does not follow that A&A' needs to be part of the content of s&b if S is to be part of the 
content of s&b.  (H-D7) solves the problem of tacking by disjunction, since, where S is a 
content part of T, it does not follow that for arbitrary S',  SvS' is part of the content of 
(T&b).  (H-D7) solves the problem of instance confirmation analogously to the method of 
(H-D3) since it produces the result that, for instance, 'Ba' confirms axiom '(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx) 
relative to 'Ra'.   (H-D7) generally has the result that where αc&βc is an instance of the 
universal generalization (x)(αx ⊃ ßx) then ßc confirms (x)(αx ⊃ ßx) relative to αc.  (H-
D7) does not produce an analog of (H-5)'s inductivist result that 'Fa' confirms 'Fb', that is 
to say, it does not have the result that 'Fa' confirms 'Fb' (relative to any tautology t).  Nor 
does it have the results that 'Fb&~Fc&~Fd&~Fe' confirms both 'Fa' and '~Fa' (relative to 
any tautology) and 'Ra&~Rb&~Rb' confirms both '(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)' and '~(x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)' 
(relative to any tautology). It does not have (H-D6)'s consequence that 'Ha&Rb&Wc&Dd' 
confirms '(x)(Hx ⊃ Rx)&(x)(Wx ⊃ Dx)&(x)(Hx ⊃ Wx)&(x)(Rx ⊃ Dx)' relative to the 
background claim 'Ra&Hb&Dc&Wd'. The point here is that there is a natural 
axiomatization of '(x)(Hx ⊃Rx)&(x)(Wx ⊃ Dx)&(x)(Hx ⊃ Wx)&(x)(Rx ⊃ Dx)', namely that 
which has the three axioms '(x)(Hx ⊃Rx)' and '(x)(Wx ⊃ Dx)' and '(x)(Rx ⊃ Wx)' which 
allows for the derivation of  'Ha&Rb&Wc&Dd'from 'Ra&Hb&Dc&Wd' using only a proper 
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subset of the three axioms, namely the first two axioms, which does not include '(x)(Hx 
⊃ Rx)&(x)(Wx ⊃ Dx)&(x)(Hx ⊃ Wx)&(x)(Rx  ⊃ Dx)' as a content part. (H-D7) does not 
have (H-D6)'s consequence that '(∃x)Fx' confirms 'Fa' since '(∃x)Fx' is not a content part 
of 'Fa'.  Finally, (H-D7), unlike (H-D6), does have the result that 'Ba' confirms 'Ra ⊃ Ba' 
relative to 'Ra' and 'Fa' confirms '(x)Fx relative to 'Fb.8    
 
5.  The Problem with H-D's core Intuition 
 While I take (H-D7) to capture the spirit of H-D better than any of (H-D1)-(H-D6) 
does, this is not to say that I am wholly sympathetic to that spirit.  While being H-D 
confirmed by some available evidence certainly counts in favor of a claim, speaking 
plainly, the problem with H-D is that it is not sufficiently inductivist.  This charge may 
come as a surprise since it is often assumed that H-D involves some tacit form of 
inductivism, that H-D, for instance, allows that were 'Fa' confirms '(x)Fx' then that 
confirmation spills over to other parts of '(x)Fx' that extent beyond 'Fa'.  In fact, 
canonical formulations of H-D such as (H-D1) expressly have the consequence that 'Fa' 
does not confirm such parts of '(x)Fx' as 'Fb', since Fa ├ Fb.  Canonical forms of H-D 
typically demand a deductive linkbetween a hypothesis and any confirmatory evidence 
for it.  Since, by definition, there is no deductive link between the deductively untested 
parts of a hypothesis and such evidence it cannot confirm those parts.  Though it is 
                                                          
8 (H-D7) has it's own minor foibles.  For instance, like (H-D5), and (H-D6), (H-D7) has the 
consequence that 'FavFb' does not H-D confirm '(x)Fx'.  However in this business it is better to 
be a little exclusive than too inclusive.  Furthermore, recasting (H-D7) in a recursive form, 
allowing a recursion clause such as 'If both S and S' hypothetico-deductively confirm axiom A of 
theory T relative to background evidence b then SvS' hypothetico-deductively confirms axiom A 
of theory T relative to background evidence b, would yield a version of (H-D7) which allowed 
that 'FavFb' confirms '(x)Fx'. 
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often unnoticed, H-D confirmation is in fact to some extent similar to Popperian 
corroborationism.  It allows that a claim may be tested by finding some consequence of 
it to be true but it does not allow that this confirms the deductively untested parts of the 
claim.  Similarly, according to Popper, 'Fa' corroborates '(x)Fx' but does not confirm 'Fb'.  
It is worth recalling that H-D, like Popper's corroborationism, was originally developed 
as an alternative to genuine inductivist accounts of confirmation.  The underlying 
rationale behind versions of H-D such as (H-D1) and Popper's corroborationism is that 
'Fa' confirms '(x)Fx' because it eliminates a as a potential falsifier of '(x)Fx'.  But there is 
much more to confirmation than merely cutting the untested content of a hypothesis.  In 
particular, there is the real confirmation that comes when evidence actually confirms the 
deductively untested parts of a hypothesis.9  Of course, it is open to the advocate of H-
D to claim that H-D confirmation is just one brand of confirmation.  Thus where the 
ambitious (H-D1)-(H-D6) offers necessary and sufficient conditions for confirmation, the 
more cagey (H-D7) speaks only of necessary and sufficient condition for hypothetico-
deductive confirmation.  The advocate of (H-D7) can say that while 'Fa' hypothetically 
deductively confirms '(x)Fx' (relative to any tautology) and does not hypothetico-
deductively confirm 'Fb', 'Fa' still confirms 'Fb' in some non hypothetico-deductive way.  
But then much of our interest would deservedly shift to the question of what exactly is 
this other way.10
 
9 For more on this see Gemes (1996a). 
10  It is worth noting that Hempel actually abandoned the predictive theory of confirmation not 
because he thought it was open to counter-examples but because it provided only a sufficient but 
not necessary condition for confirmation (see Hempel 1965, p.27).  This is not to say that 
Hempel clearly recognized that H-D accounts are flawed in that they did not allow that evidence 
can confirm a hypothesis deductively untested by that evidence. 
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6. The Criterion  of Empirical Significance 
 In his "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation", Hempel after presenting the Prediction-
Criterion appends the following footnote  
 
The following quotations from A.J. Ayer's book Language, Truth and Logic 
(London, 1936) formulate in a particularly clear fashion the conception of 
confirmation as successful prediction (although the two are not explicitly defined 
by definition): "...the function of an empirical hypothesis is to enable us to 
anticipate experience. Accordingly, if an observation to which a given proposition 
is relevant conforms to our expectations,...that proposition is confirmed (loc. cit. 
pp. 142-3, [1971, p. 130]); "it is the mark of a genuine factual proposition ...that 
some experiential propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain 
other premises without being deducible from those other premises alone." (loc. 
cit. p. 26, [1971, p. 52]). (Hempel 1965, p. 27). 
This quotation is interesting in that the two quotation it cites as precursors of the 
prediction-criterion point in slightly different philosophical directions.  The first quotation 
from Ayer, while initially talking of the function of an empirical hypothesis, concludes by 
giving the nucleus of the H-D account of the confirmation of empirical propositions, and, 
indeed, the quoted text is preceded by a direct posing of the question "What is the 
criterion by which we test the validity of an empirical proposition?" (Ayer 1971, p.131).  
The second quotation is explicitly addressed to the problem of what constitutes the 
mark of a genuinely factual proposition.  We may take it that for Hempel and Ayer the 
empirical and the factual are two sides of the same coin.  Now the question of how one 
confirms a factual/empirical proposition and the question of how one identifies a 
genuine factual/empirical proposition need not be seen as one and the same question.  
For instance, switching to the more congenial idiom of statements rather than the idiom 
of propositions, one might claim that while the mark of a genuine empirical statement is 
that it together with certain other statements implies some observation statement not 
implied by the other statements alone, nevertheless a statement, with or without the 
presence of certain other statements, need not entail a given observation statement to 
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be confirmed by that statement.  Despite the positivists' inclination, the question of 
empirical significance and the question of confirmation do not have to be identified as 
one and the same question. 
 The search for a criterion of empirical significance did not much outlive the 
failings of the numerous attempts to give a formal criterion of empirical significance.  
Perhaps this has something to do with the grandiose names and aspirations these 
attempts paraded under; the search for a criterion of meaningfulness, the search for a 
criterion of cognitive significance.  Certainly the imperialistic ambitions that spawned 
that search, the desire to overthrow the evil empire of metaphysics, have long been 
deemed philosophically incorrect.  At any rate, while the search for the criteria of 
empirical significance has all but been abandoned as a completely degenerate project, 
the hypothetico-deductive account of confirmation that was spawned along with it has 
better weathered the test of time.  H-D has shown a remarkable ability to live on despite 
the continued failures to give a precise version, while the positivists' account of 
empirical significance pretty much died with the failure of the attempts to formulate it 
precisely.  But once we have separated the question of empirical significance from the 
question of confirmation we may well ask ourselves whether in fact the question of what 
a given statement entails, the question of whether it together with other statements 
entails an observation statement, is not more relevant to the question of its empirical 
significance than to the question of its confirmation.  If this is so the historical verdict 
needs to be reversed; the positivistic H-D can be rejected as a degenerate research 
program while the attempt to give an account of empirical significance deserves closer 
attention. 
 Indeed, I believe, the machinery of (H-D7) can with a little work be turned into a 
workable criterion of empirical significance which pretty much captures the intuition 
behind the second quotation from Ayer, the intuition that a sentence is significant within 
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a theory if it adds to the observational consequences of the theory as a whole.11  To 
make good that intuition one needs an account of a natural representation of a theory, 
otherwise one finds oneself in the bind famously faced by Ayer, that is, the bind of 
having to recognize that even that Hiedeggerian bete noir 'The nothing nothings' is 
empirically significant within the theory consisting of the two claims 'The nothing 
nothings' and 'If the nothing nothings then Sydney has a harbor bridge'.12   Now the 
notion of a natural axiomatization used in (H-D7) provides the needed notion of a 
natural representation.  The theory consisting of the two claims 'The nothing nothings' 
11  Where Ayer's talk of "certain other propositions" seems to be pointing to the combination of, 
say, a universal generalization with an instantiation of its antecedent clause, my talk of a 
sentence "within a theory" points to a much more inclusive background.  Perhaps some readers 
will feel that in this shift I obscure one of the main reasons why the positivists' project of finding 
a criterion of empirical significance has been abandoned, that reason being the wide scale 
acceptance of Quine's holistic strictures against the notion of a single sentence having its own 
fund of empirical (experiential) consequences.   While there is some truth in this claim it is worth 
noting that Ayer in Language Truth and Logic (see Ayer 1972, p.125) and Hempel in his 
"Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance" (see Hempel 1965, p. 112) and his much earlier 
"On the Logical Positivists Theory of Truth" made due recognition of holism.  The triumph of 
holism does not account for the demise of the project of searching for a criterion of empirical 
significance though it may well be part of the account of the abandonment of the Carnapian 
project of attempting to reduce statements about material objects to statements about experience. 
12 'The Nothing nothings' was of course the principle target of Carnap's "The Elimination of 
Metaphysics", though in Ayer (1971, p. 59) there is a little rough handling of Heidegger's 
Nothing.  Ayer (1971, p. 15 and p. 49) is more explicitly concerned with 'The Absolute is lazy' 
and the claim ' The Absolute enters into, but is incapable of, evolution and progress' which Ayer 
attributes to Bradley. 
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and 'If the nothing nothings then Sydney has a harbor bridge' is naturally represented as 
the theory consisting of the conjunction of the two claims 'The nothing nothings' and 
'Sydney has a harbor bridge', and in this formulation 'The nothing nothings' does 
nothing to add to the empirical content of the total theory. The point here is that before 
we see if a sentence adds to the empirical content of a theory and hence is an 
empirically significant part of the theory we must first determine what counts as a 
natural axiomatization of the theory.  Once we have a a clear notion of what counts as a 
natural axiomatization of the theory we then see if there is some natural axiomatization 
which contains a subset of axioms which are empirically equivalent to the theory but do 
not contain the sentence in question as a content part.  This insight may be generalized 
into the following account of empirical significance 
 
(E.S.)  Axiom A of theory T is an empirically significant part of T iff for any natural 
axiomatization T(n) of T there is no subset S of T(n) such that S is empirically 
equivalent to T and A is not a content part of S. 
  In keeping with tradition, I will not say much about what exactly counts as 
empirical equivalence.  Typically, this is glossed by assuming a division of the 
vocabulary of the language in question into a set of theoretical terms and observational 
terms, and, hence, theoretical statements and observational statements, and defining 
two theories expressed in the language as being empirically equivalent iff they entail the 
same set of observation statements.  However, I suggest, we need a broader notion of 
empirical equivalence, perhaps something along the following lines:  Two theories are 
empirically equivalent iff they bear the same probabilistic relations to any given 
observation statement.  This would go some way to accommodating statistical 
hypotheses which often do not deductively entail any observational consequences even 
in the context of a wider theory. 
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 Now suppose the above account of empirical significance holds.  Does that mean 
it's time to once again declare open season on Heideggerians, Hegelians, and 
metaphysicians of all stripes?  I think that would be a little too hasty a conclusion.  It is 
true that being empirically significant is a virtue, and it may well be true that adding, for 
instance, Hiedeggerian claims to our current beliefs (or, in the case of converts, 
subtracting Heideggerian claims from their current beliefs) does not change the 
empirical content of those beliefs.  But, pace the Positivists' suggestion, there are other 
virtues besides that of being empirically significant (and/or analytically true) and before 
we relegate, Heideggerianism, Hegelianism, Metaphysics, et al, to the dustbin of history 
we need to get a clearer notion of what these other virtues are and which theories 
partake of them.13   
13  This is not to say that the positivists did not recognize other virtues such as that of simplicity.  
Rather the point is that they tended to count being empirically significant or analytic as a 
necessary condition for being worthy of any credence.  For more on the notion of there being a 
range of theoretical virtues and for an account of some of these virtues see Gemes (1994a). 
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